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Summary
Remarkably, despite the tremendous success of axiomatic set-theory in mathe-
matics, logic and meta-mathematics, e.g. model-theory, two philosophical worries
about axiomatic set-theory as the adequate catch of the set-concept keep haunt-
ing it. Having dealt with one worry in a previous paper in this journal, we now
fulfil a promise made there, namely to deal with the second worry. The second
worry is the Skolem Paradox and its ensuing ‘Skolemite skepticism’. We present
a comparatively novel and simple analysis of the argument of the Skolemite
skeptic, which will reveal a general assumption concerning the meaning of the
set-concept (we call it ‘Connexion M’). We argue that the Skolemite skeptic’s ar-
gument is a petitio principii and that consequently we find ourselves in a dialecti-
cal situation of stalemate.
Few (if any) working set-theoreticians feel a tension — let alone see a para-
dox — between, on the one hand, what the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems and
related results seem to be telling us about the set-concept, and, on the other
hand, their uncompromising and successful use of the set-concept and their con-
tinuing enthusiasm about it, in other words: their lack of skepticism about the
set-concept. Further, most (if not all) working set-theoreticians have a relaxed at-
titude towards the ubiquitous undecidability phenomenon in set-theory, rather
than a worrying one. We argue these are genuine philosophical problems about the
practice of set-theory. We propound solutions, which crucially involve a renuncia-
tion of Connexion M. This breaks the dialectical situation of stalemate against the
Skolemite skeptic.
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1 Skolemite Skepticism
Famously, the Norwegian logician and mathematician Thoralf Skolem [1922: 237] became
skeptical about axiomatic set-theory as a foundation for mathematics:
(. . .) secondly, I believed that it was so clear that axiomatisation in terms of sets was not
a satisfactory ultimate foundation of mathematics that the majority of mathematicians
would not be much concerned with it. But in recent times I have seen, to my own sur-
prise, that very many mathematicians think that these axioms of set-theory provide the
ideal foundation for mathematics; therefore it seems to me that the time has come to
publish a critique.
The reason that set-theory flounders as a foundation for mathematics is that the axioma-
tised theory makes its fundamental concepts, e.g. denumerability, subset and cardinality,
‘relative’. In Skolem [1929: 42] it is said of the set-concept that “eine vollsta¨ndige Charak-
teristik is wohl nicht mo¨glich”; in Skolem [1922: 224] one reads about denumerable set B
in a denumerable model “dass die Dinge in B ein andere und weit eingeschra¨nktere Bedeu-
tung haben”; in Skolem [1958: 13] one reads “le caracte´re vague de la notion d’ensemble”;
and in Skolem [1962: 218] one reads that “there is no reason to assume the notion of ‘sub-
set’ to have an absolute meaning”, as in Skolem [1941: 468] that “les sens de ces concepts
n’est pas absolu”. So the set-concept cannot be ‘completely characterised’, has a ‘shrunken
meaning’ in a denumerable model, is ‘vague’, is ‘relative’, has no ‘absolute meaning’ and no
‘absolute sense’. Skolem is here using words from colloquial language to express the same
meta-mathematical phenomenon that his (and other’s) meta-theorems have discovered. For
a philosopher, however, these expressions are different and have different implications. One
of our tasks will be to seek out what exactly these meta-mathematical discoveries do and do
not imply philosophically. But let us first state the crucial meta-theorems, if only for the sake
of future reference.
We denote the standard 1st-order formal language of set-theory by L∈.1 ZFC is standard,
Zermelo-Fraenkel set-theory, ZF is ZFC but without the axiom of Choice (C), and Z is ZF
without the axiom of Replacement (F) but with the axiom of pair-sets and the axiom schema
of separation; see Fraenkel et al. [1973: 22]. We position ourselves in a suitable meta-theory,
such as ZFC+, which is ZFC plus the existence of the first non-denumerable strongly inac-
cessible cardinal number, denoted by i. Let V be the cumulative hierarchy of all pure sets of
ordinal rank smaller than i. This yields the standard model of ZFC and its deductive children
(ZF, ZC, Z):
〈V, ∈〉 |= ZFC . (1)
1It has only variables, called set-variables and one primitive, dyadic predicate: ‘is a member of’, denoted by
Peano’s ∈.
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The phrase ‘Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem’ refers to a family of closely connected meta-
mathematical theorems. The following version suffices for our purposes.
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Meta-Theorem. Every consistent set of 1st-order sentences,
hence every consistent 1st-order theory, has a numerical model; and it has a denumer-
able model as well as models of every larger cardinality such that the smaller model
always is a submodel of every larger one.2
(2)
If ZFC is consistent, then according to meta-theorem (2) there is some relation E between
the natural numbers (E ⊂ N × N) that behaves like the membership-relation so as to have
a numerical model:
〈N, E〉 |= ZFC . (3)
From meta-theorems (1) and (3) it follows that ZFC is not a categorical theory, a conclusion
which generalises to every consistent set of 1st-order sentences. This was first observed by
John von Neumann [1925]:
Von Neumann’s Corollary. No 1st-order set-theory that has a model can be cate-
gorical, which is to say that not all models that make a consistent 1st-order set-theory
true are isomorphic.
(4)
So ZFC and all its deductive children are not categorical. In fact, as we know after the Go¨del-
Cohen purifications, models of ZF are not just non-isomorphic; they can differ tremendously.
Finally, let Th be any set-theory formulated in L∈. Call ϕ(·, Y), which is an arbitrary set-
theoretical predicate (an open sentence of L∈, possibly with set-parameters abbreviated by Y)
referentially indeterminate in Th iff there is a set Z (i) that exists and meets ϕ(·, Y) according
to Th, i.e. Th ` ϕ(Z, Y); and Th has two models 〈M1, E1〉 and 〈M2, E2〉 such that (ii) the
first model is a submodel of the second one (M1 ⊆ M2 and E1 ⊆ E2), and (iii) set-term ‘Z’
has a common referent in both models, A ∈ M1 ∩ M2 = M1 say, such that 〈M1, E1〉 makes
ϕ(A, Y) true and 〈M2, E2〉 makes ϕ(A, Y) false (cf. McIntosh [1979: 322]). We point out that
part (i) of this definition is a non-triviality requirement; part (ii) ensures that in so far as the
models are comparable (on M1 ∩ M2), they referentially-interpret L∈ identically; and part
(iii) makes the models assert, precisely where they are comparable, conflicting things about
the same referent-set (A) of the same set-term (‘Z’). Let us also call set-theory Th referentially
indeterminate iff L∈ has some predicate that is referentially indeterminate in Th. McIntosh
[1979] deduced from meta-theorem (2) the following.
McIntosh’ Corollary. ZF has two models, one being a submodel of the other, such
that both models assign the same set, A say, to the set-term ‘℘N’ (the power-set
of N), and such that one model makes true some assertion about A, namely that
it is denumerable, whereas the other model makes the same assertion about A false;
hence ZF is referentially indeterminate.
(5)
2For proofs, see Skolem [1920], [1922], which includes a proof of the numerical version without using the
Axiom of Choice; Skolem [1929]; Tarski and Vaught [1957: 93] first proved the ‘upwards’ version in (2), which
is equivalent to Choice, cf. Hodges [1993: 87-94].
2
Of course every 1st-order set-theory is referentially indeterminate due to Von Neumann’s
Corollary (4), not only ZF.
These meta-mathematical results give rise to: (a) the Skolem Paradox and (b) Skolemite
Skepticism. We next briefly explicate what this means, following McIntosh [1979] and Be-
nacerraf [1985], but simplifying things considerably and going directly to the heart of the
matter by bringing to the surface a premise of a general character which so far has never
been formulated explicitly (‘Connexion M’), but is needed to have a valid philosophical
argument. Then we are in a position to announce what the present paper attempts to con-
tribute to the extant literature on the Skolemite subject-matter.3
(a) The Skolem Paradox. Consider, with Skolem, Cantor’s Theorem: there exist non-denumerable
sets, such as the set of real numbers (R) and the power-set of the set of natural numbers
(℘N):
Z ` ¬Denum(R) ∧ ¬Denum(℘N) , (6)
wherein predicate Denum(X) stands for ‘X is denumerable’, i.e. ‘X is equinumerous to N’,
i.e. there is a bijection, or one-one correspondence, from set X to N (everyone thus unhesi-
tatingly accepts N as the standard of denumerability). All models of a theory make all its
theorems true, so for numerical model (3) and Cantor’s Theorem (6) we have:
〈N, E〉 |= ¬Denum(R) ∧ ¬Denum(℘N) . (7)
Skolem [1922: 223] wondered: “How can it be that the entire range R can be enumerated
by the positive integers?” Indeed, how on Earth can the demonstrably non-denumerable sets
called ‘℘N’ and ‘R’ have referents that can have at most a denumerable number of members?
How can the sets R and ℘N — let alone larger sets such as ℘℘R, ℘℘℘N, ℘ℵω, etc. —
survive in model 〈N, E〉 (3) that seems far too sparsely populated in order to supply set
℘N, R and the larger sets with the members they need? Whereas the standard model 〈V,∈〉
(1) fills all sets with exactly the number of members they must have according to ZFC, the
numerical model 〈N, E〉 lacks the resources to do so yet makes true the existence of sets that
are larger than N (7). So the size of sets seems up for grabs: we say there are sets which have
non-denumerably many members (℘N and R), but these sets (or better: the set-terms ‘℘N’
and ‘R’ in L∈) can refer to sets which have no more members than there are natural numbers.
This situation is known as the Skolem Paradox.
It is important to realise there is no ‘Skolem Contradiction’ here. The denumerable do-
main N of model 〈N, E〉 (3) does have ‘too few’ members to fill the sets ℘N and R with
the non-denumerably many members that these sets seem to require; nevertheless it makes
true Cantor’s Theorem that ℘N and R are non-denumerable sets (6), because 〈N, E〉 is so
sparsely populated that it does not contain a single bijection from the referent of ‘N’ in N to
the referents of ‘℘N’ and ‘R’ in N either. The non-existence of this bijection is exactly what
makes Cantor’s Theorem true. In the standard model 〈V,∈〉 we have recourse to literally all
functions from N to ℘N and from N to R, but among them there is not a single bijection,
3McIntosh [1979], Putnam [1980], George [1985], Benacerraf [1985], Wright [1985], Field [1994], Hallett
[1994], Jane´ [2001].
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simply because N has too few members when compared to ℘N and to R. So in these two
different models we have a different explanation of the same truth.
(b) Skolemite Skepticism. We consider two related kinds of ‘Skolemite skepticism’. First
we define a Founding Theory of Mathematics (F) to be a theory such that (F1) all concepts of
mathematics can be translated in the (formalised) language of F, and (F2) all thus translated
theorems of mathematics, accepted by the mathematical community as proved, are theorems
in F. We say that F founds mathematics adequately iff F founds mathematics and captures the
meanings of the primitive concepts of F adequately (read on for the meaning of ‘adequate’).
The two skeptical theses read as follows.
Foundational Skepticism. No 1st-order set-theory can found mathematics ade-
quately.
(8)
This first thesis concerns the foundations of mathematics, in particular the foundational
status of set-theory. The second thesis concerns 1st-order set-theory ‘itself’, independent
from its putative status as an occupant of the foundational throne:
Set-Skepticism. No consistent 1st-order set-theory captures the meaning of the set-
concept adequately; every 1st-order theory fails in capturing the meaning of the set-
concept adequately.
(9)
Skolem subscribed to both skeptical theses (8) and (9) — as is evident from the quotations
in the opening paragraph of this paper. Zermelo and Von Neumann followed suit.4 Set-
Skepticism (9) is prima facie the general message that the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems seem
to be conveying. How exactly this comes about, we are going to spell out right now.
Set-theory ZC (Zermelo’s original theory of 1908 extended with Von Neumann’s axiom of
regularity) still suffices to found about 99% of current mathematics; ZFC hauls in some of the
missing 1% (mostly transfinite cardinal arithmetic); and ZFC+ suffices to haul in category
theory too, in particular the theory of large categories, which presents the only real threat to
set-theoretical foundations ever since set-theory came to occupy the foundational throne.5
So the following thesis is an established truth:
Set-Foundation Thesis. There is some 1st-order set-theory that founds mathemat-
ics, for example ZFC+.
(10)
Yet these 1st-order set-theories are supposed to fail as adequate founding theories of mathe-
matics. What is sufficient and necessary to reach this conclusion on the basis of Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem (2) is the following conditional (M of Meaning):
Connexion M. If a theory captures the meaning of its primitive concepts adequately,
then it makes all meaning-constitutive predicates of the set-concept referentially deter-
minate.
(11)
4See Neumann [1925]; for analyses of the skeptical views of Skolem and Zermelo, see Benacerraf [1985],
George [1985], Fraenkel et al. [1973: 302-305], Dalen and Ebbinghaus [2000] and Jane´ [2001].
5See Muller [2001] for a 1st-order theory of sets and classes logically weaker than ZFC+ yet still being able
to found all of mathematics, including all of category theory; there we argue that ZFC+ and sibling pure
set-theories are all conceptually flawed as a founding theory for category theory.
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So, to arrive in logically valid fashion at the two skeptical theses (9) and (8), the skeptic
does not need to delve into the meaning of ‘adequate’ (as one may have feared), but only
needs to accept referential determinacy as a necessary condition of it — substitute your own
favourite adjective in stead of ‘adequate’ to get your own version of set-skepticism going:
precise, complete, exact, absolute, sharp, indeterminate, etc.
We now need to say what the ‘meaning-constitutive’ predicates of the set-concept are
(11). In Section 2 we shall address this subject more elaborately; for the moment it suffices
to say that denumerability and finiteness count as such predicates. The logic of the skeptical
arrangement is, then, crystal clear: we prove there are referentially indeterminate meaning-
constitutive predicates in every 1st-order set-theory (5). Then, by Connexion M (11), set-
theory does not capture the meaning of the set-concept adequately. This is Set-Skepticism
(9). Now, according to the Set-Foundation Thesis (10), some 1st-order set-theory can found
mathematics, but does it inadequately (9). This is Foundational Skepticism (8). To summarise:
Lo¨wSk Thm. (2) ∧ Connexion M (11) −→ Set-Skepticism (9) ,
Set-Skepticism (9) ∧ Set-Found. (10) −→ Found. Skepticism (8) .
(12)
Notice that if one does not insist on a founding theory that it should perform its duties
as a meaning-catcher adequately, then the inference from Set-Skepticism (9) to Foundational
Skepticism (8) fails.
The point is that both the foundational skeptic and the set-skeptic need as an assumption
Connexion M (11), which so far has drawn little attention in the literature on the Skolem
Paradox (if mentioned at all: see footnote 3). Connexion M provides the bridge to go from
meta-mathematical discourse, where only proof and disproof rule, to philosophical discourse,
where (among other things) the meaning of concepts is analysed. Bringing Connexion M to
the fore will enable us to attain a more general perspective on the Skolem trouble, namely
a perspective in the philosophy of language. But most of all, this opens a novel route for
escaping from the skeptic’s conclusions as well as for making sense of the practice of set-
theory.
Let us finally emphasise that our analysis is not (supposed to) prejudge on the realism-
issue in mathematics. Both Realists and Nominalists can endorse the present analyses as
well as the conclusions we shall arrive at in the present paper. In this paper we want to
reach six aims (A-F).
Aim A. To introduce Aim A, we quote H.R. Putnam [1980: 481-482] from his first paper
on his celebrated model-argument against ‘metaphysical realism’, where he pointed in a
Wittgensteinian direction for dissolving Skolemite skepticism:
The philosophical problem appears at just this point. If we are told, ‘axiomatic set-theory
does not capture the intuitive notion of a set’, then it is natural to think that something
else — our ‘understanding’ — does capture it. But what can our ‘understanding’ come
to, at least for a naturalistically minded philosopher, which is more than the way we use
our language?
(. . .)
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To adopt a theory of meaning according to which a language whose whole use is spec-
ified still lacks something, viz. its interpretation, is to accept a problem which can only
have a crazy solution. To speak as if this were my problem, ‘I know how to use my lan-
guage, but how shall I single out an interpretation of it?’ is to speak nonsense. Either the
use already fixes the ‘interpretation’ or nothing can.
Observe the tacit acceptance of Putnam of Connexion M (11) to arrive at Set-Skepticism
from Skolem’s meta-theorems! (Observe also that Putnam’s “does not capture the intuitive
notion of a set” is our “does not capture the meaning of the set-concept adequately”.) Put-
nam is here pointing in the right direction but leaves it at that. It is someting of a scandal that
everyone has left it at that. Surely philosophers of mathematics cannot leave matters at the
stage of finger-pointing, can they? By means of Horwich’s Wittgensteinian theory of mean-
ing called semantic deflationism and an improved conception of ‘implicit definition’ we shall
try provide a viable destination consistent with the direction of Putnam’s finger-pointing.
This is Aim A and we attempt to reach it in Section 2.
Aim B. We argue that the skeptic begs the question by surreptitiously assuming Connex-
ion M; we analyse a few arguments in favour of Connexion M and find them no good; this
turns the alleged skeptic’s victory over the anti-skeptic into a dialectical position of stale-
mate (Section 3). So Aim B is to demonstrate that the skeptic’s argument is unconvincing
because it is a petitio principii. Then we argue against Connexion M from the current practice
of set-theory (Section 4).
Aim C. It is a fact that few (if any) working set-theorists feel a tension between, on the
one hand, whatever the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem (2) seems to be telling us about the
set-concept, and, on the other hand, their uncompromising and successful use of the set-
concept and their continuing enthusiasm about this concept. Is this tension real and is the
set-theoretician simply philosophically insensitive, or is this tension unreal and is the fact
that no set-theoretician feels this tension an indication that we have here a typical example of
a Scheinproblem on our hands? We claim the mentioned fact is a genuine philosophical problem
about the practice of set-theory to be solved by a philosopher, rather than a mathematical problem
to be solved by a set-theoretician. Aim C is to solve it; our solution will crucially involve a
rejection of Connexion M (Section 5).
Aim D. A fact about the practice of set-theory similar to the one just mentioned is that
quite a few set-theoreticians regard the meta-mathematical fact that there is a legion of un-
decidable statements, of which the continuum hypothesis is the most celebrated example,
not as a defect of set-theory. They have developed a remarkably relaxed attitude towards the
ubiquitous undecidability phenomenon. This, too, is a genuine philosophical problem about the
practice of set-theory. Aim D is to solve it (Section 6).
Aims E and F. Finally we aim to explain why we are so easily seduced into taking Con-
nexion M for granted; this is Aim E. (Section 7). As soon as we realise the grounds for taking
Connexion M for granted, it begins to dissolve, or so we claim. Collecting the arguments
against Connexion M from Sections 4, 5 and 7 we shall have reached out final Aim F, which
is to show that Connexion M is not a reasonable premise for a philosophical argument. This
will then break the dialectical situation of stalemate reached by Aim C and hopefully turns
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it into a defeat of Connexion M.
In a sense to be explained at the end of the next Section, we shall have reached, when our
aims are fulfilled, a viable destination which, at best, has been pointed at from a distance by
Putnam [1980] and by Wright [1985].
As far as our limited vision permits us to see, the two mentioned problems concern-
ing the practice of set-theory have been ignored by philosophers of mathematics. This is
something of a scandal too, we submit. Philosophers of mathematics should mobilise their
analytic apparatus to hunt down philosophical problems concerning the practice of math-
ematics and then try to solve them — and not only be occupied by the tantalising question
whether abstract objects really exist. We claim to have discovered two of such problems and
we claim to have viable solutions of them. Perhaps we are wrong. But at least we do not go
gently into that dark night. We shall prevent the dying of the light as long as we can.
Enough rhetorics! Let’s go to work now. Before we start, we must mention that in this
paper we presuppose the superiority of 1st-order over 2nd-order classical predicate logic as
the provider of a sound, complete, topic-neutral, recursively enumerable deductive appara-
tus and of a concomitantly viable notion of proof — by which we mean that every proof of
a theorem accepted by the mathematical community can be faithfully construed as a valid
proof in 1st-order predicate logic (Hilbert-Ackermann thesis). So those who agree with us
on this presupposition (for which we cannot argue hic et nunc) can accept our conclusions
as soon as they also accept the theory of meaning we employ (semantic deflationism); and
those who favour 2nd-order logic can no longer claim the necessity of adopting 2nd-order
logic in order to avoid Skolemite skepticism. Thus for friends and foes of 1st-order logic
there should be something to learn from the present paper.
2 The Meaning of the Set-Concept
Wittgenstein famously held the use of an expression to be the clue to its meaning [1953: § 43],
[1979: 48]. To know the meaning of an expression is to understand it; and to understand an
expression is the capability to use it correctly, i.e. in agreement with the semantic rules that can
be considered to govern the use in a particular linguistic practice, or context, or in Wittgen-
steinian slang: to govern the language-game we happen to play. These semantic rules fix the
semantic grammar of words and expressions, just as syntactic rules fix the syntactic gram-
mar of sentences in a language, their ‘grammatical form’. Unlike syntactical rules, however,
which are transcontextual, i.e. they generally hold in (almost) every context, semantic rules
for a given expression can be contextual, i.e. for the same expression they can vary from one
context to another. So, succinctly, an expression can acquire meaning iff it is possible to have
some context and a language in which the expression occurs and can be used successfully by
a community of language-users. In principle, then, every expression can acquire a meaning,
but of course not every expression has (acquired) a meaning.
Although Wittgenstein avoided building a philosophical theory of meaning like the plague,
very few doubt that Wittgenstein had some coherent conception of meaning in mind, on the
basis of which he performed his analyses and from which he launched his criticisms. In his
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book Meaning [1998], Horwich expounds a theory of meaning which he has baptised seman-
tic deflationism; it is intended to clarify Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning (and truth), and
to support and to apply it. We are going to employ semantic deflationism.
Semantic deflationism counts five postulates (some terminology and simplifications are
ours).
I. Concept Postulate. Meanings are concepts and concepts are abstract objects.
II. Use Postulate. For every expression there is a ‘small’ submanual of its use manual that
constitutes its meaning; this submanual we call the ‘meaning-manual’ of the expression.
III. Synonymy Postulate. Synonyms have the same meaning-manuals.
IV. Truth Postulate (Convention T). For any proposition P, ‘P’ is true iff P.
V. Reference Postulate. The propositional content of term τb (usually: ‘b’) designates object c
iff b is identical to c. Term τb refers to object c iff there is some term, σa say, such that: σa and
σb have the same propositional content, and σa designates c.
Since postulates III, IV and V will play no part in this paper, we can afford to ignore them
(we merely have included them here for the sake of completeness). Next follow a few words
to explain postulates I and II.
The assertion that meanings are abstract objects is merely to distinguish them from con-
crete objects — no transcendent realm of meanings is or needs to be posited. The use of some
expression in a language, ξ say, is the sum-total of all contexts in which some expression is
spoken or written that contains ξ (over some period of historical time). We can label the con-
texts, thus denoted by Cj (j ∈ N), and the concomitant expressions so as to make ordered
pairs of type
〈
Cj, Lj[ξ]
〉
, were Lj[ξ] is a list of expressions σ0[ξ], . . . , σk[ξ] that each contain
expression ξ (k ∈ N). So the idea is the following (l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k j): in context Cj, the usage
of any expression σl[ξ] ∈ Lj[ξ] is appropriate. We collect all the ordered pairs in U(ξ), which
we call the use-manual of expression ξ. List L j[ξ] will generically contain many expressions,
because quite a number of expressions containing ξ will be appropriate in the given context
Cj. The same expression can be used on different occasions, e.g. ‘This is good’, ‘That is big’,
so that it will occur in many lists of many contexts. The meaning of the word ‘small’ will
depend heavily on the context (it means something different in subnuclear physics than in
architecture); so ‘small’ has a contextual meaning. In contrast, the meaning of a word like
‘and’ and an expression like ‘is larger than’ will be the same in all contexts; they have a
transcontextual meaning. For Horwich, the meaning of every linguistic expression, ξ say,
is a property of it in context Cj, which we abbreviate by M(ξ, Cj); this property is a concept, y
say, which in turn is an abstract object, so that M(ξ, C j) = y.6 Horwich [1998, passim] writes
things like: M(cat) = cat, which is supposed to mean that the meaning of the word ‘cat’ is
the abstract object cat (reassuring remark: ‘cat’ also refers to cats, the familiar hairy creatures
we can interact with physically — but not mentally).
6So rather than a property meaning looks more like a relation: between an expression and a context. Let
that pass.
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The notion of ‘to constitute’ in the Use Postulate is supposed to be the familiar one, as in:
‘consisting of H2SO4-molecules’ constitutes ‘being vitriol’, and ‘air molecules vibrating lon-
gitudinally with a frequencies between 20 and 20,000 Hz’ constitutes ‘being sound’. Hence
‘to constitute’ seems a relation between properties, which we describe by predicates. Let F
en G be two predicates, which need not have the same logical form. Then Horwich defines
[1998: 25]: F constitutes G iff (c1) F and G apply to the same things; and (c2) F and (c1) ex-
plain facts about G. The predicates ‘being vitriol’ (G) and ‘consisting of H2SO4-molecules’
(F) apply to concrete objects (c1); and facts about H2SO4-molecules and about what happens
when you take lots of them together explain the facts of vitriol, e.g. its liquid state at room
temperature, transparency, viscosity, adhesion, smell and capability to solve many chemical
substances and others not (c2).
Call a submanual of U(ξ) a collection of contexts C j occurring in U(ξ), each one paired
with a sublist from the list, Lj[ξ], occurring in U(ξ). At last we can understand what is being
asserted in the Use Postulate: every expression has a ‘small’ submanual that constitutes its
meaning. This meaning-manual, denoted by M(ξ), then, is supposed to explain the overall
use of the expression (this follows from how ‘constitutes’ was defined above); it should be
taken as Wittgenstein’s ‘semantic grammar’. The smaller it is, the more bite will the theory
have and the more the theory will take a stand against the utterly implausible ‘meaning
holism’, which takes every newly uttered expression that includes a given word to contribute
to the meaning of that word. (See Horwich [1998: 45] for examples of words whose meaning-
manual counts a few items only.) So much for semantic deflationism generally. We now turn
to the idea of an implicit definition.
A definition of some expression in a language is semantic; it is another expression stated
explicitly in the same language. The meaning of the definiendum is by convention asserted
to be the same as the meaning of the definiens; a synonymous expression has been given.
This is the standard notion of a definition, as in: a set is denumerable iff it is equinumerous
with N; etc. Unlike in the context of mathematics, in other contexts most expressions do not
have explicit definitions. In mathematics too various concepts do not have definition, e.g.
‘set’ and ‘is a member of’; for them something between having and not having an explicit
definition will be achieved. In the penultimate letter of the exchange between Hilbert and
Frege on definitions and axioms, dated 22 September 1900, Hilbert summarised his view on
the status of axioms as follows (in Frege [1980: 51]):
In my opinion, a concept [primitive notion, FAM] can be fixed logically only by its re-
lations to other concepts. These relations, formulated in certain statements, I call ax-
ioms, thus arriving at the view that axioms (perhaps together with propositions assigning
names to concepts) are the definitions of the concepts.
Thus Hilbert, and likewise Poincare´, regarded axiomatisations as achieving something for
the primitive concepts of the language between an explicit definition and having no defini-
tion, namely an implicit definition. In his axiomatisation of Cantorian set-theory, Von Neu-
mann [1925: 36] explicitly adhered to the same view.
Now, when we restrict ourselves to mathematics, Wittgenstein’s ‘social’ conception of
meaning harmonises with Hilbert’s ‘rational’ conception of implicit definability, because
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accepted axioms of some branch of mathematics, together with the logical deduction-rules,
govern the rigourous use of the primitive notions as they are actually used by the community
of mathematicians in this branch. Hilbert’s implicit definition and Wittgenstein’s semantic
grammar seem pretty much the very same thing.
Let Th[τ, P] be an axiomatised theory in a language L(τ, P), wherein term τ and pred-
icate P form the primitive vocabulary; and let AxTh[τ, P] be the (non-empty) collection of
its axioms. (So Hilbert proposed to take AxTh[τ, P] as an implicit definition of the term τ and
the predicate P.) Suppose we have some mathematical practice that has recently established
itself as a legitimate branch at the tree of mathematical knowledge; and suppose Th[τ, P]
has been accepted as the right theory. We make a List of sentences from the mathematical
practice in which τ and P occur, called L[τ, P], that we intuitively consider to be constitu-
tive for the meaning of τ and P. We call a predicate of L(τ, P) meaning-constitutive iff it
occurs in the list L[τ, P]. Somewhat in analogy with calling a scientific theory empirically
adequate iff it saves the relevant perceptual phenomena, we call Th[τ, P] meaning-adequate iff
it saves the relevant linguistic phenomena (the meaning-constitutive sentences), that is to say,
iff Th[τ, P] ` L[τ, P]. All items in list L[τ, P] are facts about the meaning of the set-concept
indirectly referred to in the Use Postulate of semantic deflationism via the meaning of ‘to
constitute’.
Now we are able to formulate our
Implicit Definability Criterion. The axioms of a theory implicitly define its primi-
tive vocabulary iff (Cr1) it is logically possible that the axioms are true and (Cr2) they
save the relevant linguistic phenomena, which is to say that the axioms entail all the
meaning-constitutive sentences.
(13)
Elsewhere we explained what is wrong with Hilbert’s proposal to require only consistency
— which is co-extensive with (Cr1) when truth is construed model-theoretically; we formu-
lated four outstanding problems that any account of implicit definability must solve; and
we argued that adopting Criterion (13) solves all four problems (see Muller [2004]). We
therefore proceed here with Criterion (13).
In order to assert that the axioms of ZFC, denoted by AxZFC[set, ∈], qualify as an implicit
definition of the set-concept and the membership-relation, we must, according to Criterion
(13), establish that (Cr1) ZFC is possibly true and that (Cr2) ZFC saves the relevant phe-
nomena of the practice of set-theory, collected in a list L[set, ∈], which includes all meaning-
constitutive sentences up. Part of Muller [2004] was devoted to accomplish precisely this;
we therefore will not repeat it here. We also provided there a pragmatic argument in favour
of the possible truth of ZFC, in order to meet (Cr1). We want to add another argument here.
This additional argument starts by asserting that the axioms of ZFC are supposed to be
true of sets, if anything. Whatever the meaning of the word ‘set’ is, the axioms of ZFC must
be true of it. They are, in fact, analytic truths about the set-concept: the axioms of ZFC are
true of the set-concept because they single out the meaning it must have in order to make
them true. Next, ZFC is closed under 1st-order deduction, which is demonstrably sound.
So all theorems of ZFC are analytically true. We certainly know at least one sentence in the
language of ZFC that is not a theorem of ZFC. We now conclude that ZFC is a consistent
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collection of analytic truths about the set-concept — a conclusion that is actually stronger
than we need in order to meet (Cr1). Of course, by meta-mathematical necessity we cannot
formalise this argument (Go¨del), yet as an informal argument it makes sense. So much for
AxZFC[set, ∈] meeting Criterion (13).
Let next C∈ stand for the mathematical context of doing Zermelo-Fraenkel set-theory;
and let Aj∈ stand for the j-th context in which the set-concept is applied (there are finitely
many of them, say n ∈ N). We re-define the meaning-manual of the set-concept as follows:
M[set,∈] ≡
{
〈C∈, AxZFC[set,∈]〉 , 〈A
j
∈, AxZFCU[set,∈]〉
∣
∣ j = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
, (14)
where ZFCU stands for ZFC plus ‘primordial elements’ (German: Urelementen), which is a
conservative extension of ZFC.7
The Use Postulate now permits us to assert that the set-concept has a meaning which
is constituted by meaning-manual M[set, ∈] (14), which, in turn, implicitly defines the set-
concept because it meets Criterion (13). This implies that on the basis of M[set, ∈] we must
be able to explain all relevant facts concerning the meaning of the set-concept, besides L[set,
∈] of course (cf. Muller [2004]). We end this Section by sketching how the explanations work
for two other facts.
First Fact. In the practice of set-theory, results based on a proof in ZFC have by far the
highest acceptance-value (see Shelah [2002a]); the lowest value have consistency proofs;
proofs from large cardinals or in proofs in Go¨del’s universe have intermediate value. This
we take to be a fact about the practice of mathematics. When we assume that only the
axioms of ZFC (and hence their deductive consequences) are the ‘untouchable truths’ of
the set-concept (Shelah [2002a]: “ZFC exhausts our intuition”), so that axioms leading to
consistent extensions of ZFC are at best possible truths, then the very fact that ZFC exhausts
the analytic truths about the set-concept explains the big difference in acceptance-value,
because analytic truths generally have the highest acceptance-value.
Second Fact. When we teach pupils the set-concept, we mention a flock of sheep, a herd
of cattle, a school of fish, a class of pupils, the population of a country, a swarm of bees, etc.
When we explain what the union-set is, we say that the life-stock of a farmer is the union-set
of his sets of cows, chickens and sheep, say. When we explain what the intersection-set is of
the Dutch people and the Tunesian people, we say it is the set of people having a passport
of each of these countries. When we explain what the choice-set is, we imagine a cupboard
with various candy jars and choosing one candy from each of these. And so forth. How to
explain the fact that we begin explaining the abtract set-concept and several set-theoretical
notions by such concrete examples? More generally, how to explain that set-theory applies
to the world?
This is explained by pointing out that in such mundane contexts, the axioms of ZFCU
constitute the meaning of the set-concept. All mentioned objects are primordial elements
when seen through set-theoretical glasses. With the Replacement Schema also applying to
primordial elements, the meaning-manual M[set, ∈] (14) explains the applicability of set-
theory to the world, because now we can make sets of any kind of objects. (Although this
7In Muller [2004] we only considered pure mathematics.
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deserves further elaboration, it is plausible that such an elaboration can be given; for our
present purposes this is enough.)
Two more facts concerning the set-concept and the practice of set-theory will be treated
in Sections 5 and 6.
So far we have not talked in meta-mathematical tongue. But how about the model-theory
of ZFC? How about truth and reference? How do they bear on the meaning of the set-
concept? How about Connexion M? These are the questions we attempt to answer in the
following Sections, armored with our meaning-manual M[set, ∈] (14); it will lead us, at last,
to a direct confrontation with the Skolemite skeptic.
3 Dialectical Stalemate
In order to avoid lethal Cretean contradictions, we must make a choice between either doing
model-theory and move to the meta-level (Meta), or not doing model-theory and remain at the
object-level (Obj). Tertium non datur. If we choose (Obj), we cannot legitimately talk about
the notions of reference and truth. These notions occur neither at the object-level nor in the
meaning-manual of the set-concept (14), and therefore they have no bearing on the meaning
of the set-concept. It is a simple as that. When we talk about ‘the domain of discourse
of all sets’ or assert that set-theory ‘is about sets’, we must realise that this referential talk
is formally illicit because not part of L∈. When we speak about a specific set as ‘existing
(in the domain of discourse)’, we do not mean to suggest we somehow enter this domain,
suddenly see the relevant set showing its face, hunt it down and catch it with a predicate;
rather, we mean by ‘the mathematical existence of A’ the provability of a sentence of L∈ in
which X occurs and begins with an existential quantifier (∃ X : ϕ(X)) — any set-theoretician
transcending this by asserting things that cannot be translated into L∈ proceeds at his own
peril. So, confined to the object-level (Obj), the Skolemite skeptic will starve. The relevant
meta-theorems cannot even be expressed.
Choice (Meta) elevates us to the meta-level into some (informal or formal) meta-theory,
where we have the resources to define a tremendous variety of putative ‘referents’ of the set-
terms in L∈ and to define recursively ‘truth-in-a-model’ (Tarski’s satisfaction-relation |= ).
The meta-language and the meta-theory are the Skolemite skeptic’s bacchanal. (Of course
the meta-theory can still be, and usually is, a set-theory, but the conceptual resources are
enlarged, notably the possibility to mention items of L∈.) Every model provides a context
in which certain sentences of L∈ are true and others are false. Due the soundness of 1st-
order logic, all theorems of ZFC are true in all models; their truth is, model-theoretically
construed, transcontextual. Sentences which are made true in some model and false in some
other never can be meaning-constitutive. Two crucial questions now face us.
Q1. When we engage in the model-theory of set-theory, must we then
extend the meaning-manual M[set, ∈] of the set-concept?
Q2. If so, how to extend it?
(15)
First of all, the Skolemite skeptic must answer Q1 in the affirmative. For if not, then no
conclusions can be drawn from whatever happens at the meta-level (Skolem trouble) that
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will have any bearing on the meaning of the set-concept and hence on the meaning-adequacy
of ZFC. As long as we do not touch the meaning-manual, the meaning of the set-concept
trivially remains unaffected. Now, as soon as the skeptic considers Skolem trouble as a mo-
tivation for extending the meaning-manual of the set-concept into the meta-realm so as to
be able to argue in favour of the meaning-inadequacy of ZFC (9), we can justifiably appeal to
the phrase that one philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens: if enlarging the
meaning-manual into the meta-realm leads to skepticism, then this is an excellent reason
not to enlarge it. We thus have arrived at a dialectical stalemate. Therefore, if the Skolemite
skeptic wants to win, she must produce some convincing reason to answer Q1 in the affirma-
tive that makes no appeal to Skolem trouble. Since no commentator on the Skolem phenomenon
has even posed question Q1 (perhaps because all commentators take it too obvious to de-
serve mention), there is little else to do for us than try to think of a few reasons the skeptic
may advance for an answer in the affirmative of Q1 (15).
One reason to extend the meaning-manual into the meta-level might be that we must
do it in order to know how to use the set-concept at the meta-level (Meta), because how
things currently stand in the meaning-manual M[set, ∈] (14), we only know how to use
‘set’ at the object-level (Obj). Hence, on the very basis of semantic deflationism, M[set,
∈] is unacceptable because it cannot explain a single fact about the use of the set-concept
at the meta-level (and therefore does not meet the Use Postulate)! So to answer question
Q2, then, in a single sweep: we must enlarge M[set, ∈] with the definitions of the model-
theoretic notions ‘referent’, ‘referential interpretation’ and ‘truth-in-a-model’, because they
all involve the use of the set-concept at the meta-level. Not only the linguistic phenomena
at the object-level (Obj) but also those at the meta-level (Meta) must be saved in order for
M[set, ∈] to pass Criterion (13).
This reason is no good. Indeed, in order to use, at the meta-level (Meta), the notions of
referent, truth-in-a-model, etc. legitimately and rigourously, we need to have the Tarskian
definitions of them all right. But these definitions are the meaning-manuals of these newly in-
troduced model-theoretic notions. No reason has been produced for why they also must be
added to the meaning-manual of the set-concept. A reason has been produced for why we
must adopt them, not for why we must in addition lump them into M[set, ∈]. On the con-
trary, the newly added model-theoretic notions do not seem to make it necessary at all to
tinker with M[set, ∈]. Why must we strengthen it? Why can we not take the very same
concept with us in our haver-sack when we take a walk in the realm of meta-mathematics
and leave the meaning of ‘set’ unaltered? The use we make of the set-concept at the meta-
level can be explained by M[set, ∈] as it stands in combination with the meaning-manuals
of the novel model-theoretic notions (their definitions at the meta-level are their meaning-
manuals); hence M[set, ∈] still constitutes the meaning of the set-conept. All the meta-
mathematical phenomena can be saved without changing a word in M[set, ∈]. The dialecti-
cal situation of stalemate persists.
Another line of attack of the Skolemite skeptic could be to assert that Criterion (13) is too
weak, and that as an additional requirement (Cr3) one should add Connexion M (11) to it.
(This is an answer to Q2.) Then she can conclude that AxZFC[set, ∈] is not an implicit defini-
tion of the set-concept because the Skolemite meta-theorems entail that (Cr3) is violated. The
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putative fact that AxZFC[set, ∈] does not implicitly define the set-concept is also ground for
skepticism, for what else can fix its meaning? If she holds that without an implicit definition
passing Criterion (13) the set-concept is up for grabs, Set-Skepticism (9) comes within reach.
But this dialectical move, again, results in stalemate, because the anti-skeptic will say
that the Skolemite meta-theorems are an excellent reason not to add Connexion M as a third
requirement (Cr3) in Criterion (13). The skeptic must produce a reason why to add Con-
nexion M to Criterion (13) that makes no appeal to Skolem trouble. This is, however, the same
problem we have been discussing above, as a moment’s thought will reveal.
So the dialectical situation of stalemate still persists. In the next two Sections we make
an attempt to break this situation in favour of the anti-skeptic.
4 The Abstraction-Scale
What was already plausible from the practice of set-theory in the days of Zermelo, Fraenkel,
Von Neumann, Skolem, Tarski, Ulam, Sierpinski and Hausdorff, has become obvious from
the practice of set-theory today, the days of Shelah, Martin, Le´vy, Woodin, Silver, Kanamori,
Steel, Friedman, Moschovakis, Jensen, Devlin, Kunen, Drake, Enderton and Jech: the set-
concept is somewhere between (α) the numbers (natural and real), say, and (ω) a group,
a ring, a topological structure, a linearly ordered set, a functor-category, and many more.
Please indulge us to envision a scale of mathematical structures, to be referred to as the
abstraction-scale, with α and ω being the end-points, on which mathematical structures are
linearly ordered by the relation ‘is more abstract than’. Of course we do not possess a defi-
nition of this relation; but we submit the following remarks to elucidate it so as to accept it
as sufficiently meaningful to be used it in philosophical arguments.
First Elucidation: Untouchable Truths. About mathematical structures at end α all of us
(academics, say) somehow have come to possess ‘untouchable truths’. Any number-theory
that proves 1573 + 429 = 2003, that proves there are finitely many prime numbers, or that
the relation ‘is smaller than’ is not a linear ordering, is unacceptable because it violates un-
touchable truths, full stop. In the case of the natural and of the real numbers (note the use
of the definite article), we can easily draw up a list of untouchable truths, each of whose
theoremhood is a conditio sine qua non for any theory about these concepts to be taken seri-
ously. And yet even in these cases, which concern structures almost as old as mathematics
itself, there are also numerous sophisticated statements where the intuition falters, even the
highly developed intuition of specialists in the relevant fields. In these cases, whatever is
proved by the canonical theory will be accepted. At the other end of the abstraction-scale
(ω), we find the mirror situation: the intuition falls silent and only the specialist will be able
to muster a few general untouchable truths about the structures at that end, e.g. a group or
a functor-category, say, that any theory about it must save.
In general, for structures at end ω, a group say, it makes sense to say that sentence ϕ is a
truth about Abelian groups iff it is a theorem about Abelian groups, but not at end α. Think
of the Go¨del-sentence: it is demonstrably not a theorem about natural numbers but it is also
an untouchable truth about natural numbers.
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Second Elucidation: Generality. At end α of the abstraction-scale the mathematical struc-
tures are somehow most specific, whereas at ω they are most general. By ‘general’ we mean
that the practice of mathematics is populated with many different specimen of these struc-
tures. For mathematicians, the natural numbers are the natural numbers and that is the end
of it: 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .; they make up the ‘Peano-structure’ 〈N, S, 0〉 (S is the successor-relation
‘+1’), and this specific structure is ubiquitous in mathematics. The other number-structures,
Z (integers), Q (rationals), R (reals), C (complex numbers) and Q (quaternions) are also
at end α. Numbers seem to form the most specific structures of the whole of mathemat-
ics, perhaps together with the Euclidean plane. To the right of α we find a general Peano-
structure 〈N, S, a〉, meeting the Peano-axioms, of which 〈N, S, 0〉 is but one specimen — in
ZFC one proves that all ‘Peano-structures’ 〈N, S, a〉 are isomorphic.8 About here we also
find Von Neumann’s structure of a complex infinite-dimensional Hilbert-space H (also all
isomorphic in ZFC); specimen are Hilbert’s space of complex square-summable sequences
l2(N), the space of complex square-integrable functions L2(Rn) with n ∈ N real variables
(both of which are very specific and one finds these specimen near end α), the dualH∗ of con-
tinuous linear functionals of Hilbert-space H, and the space of so-called Hilbert-Schmidt op-
erators acting on any H. Towards end ω we encounter the very general concept of a vector-
space, encompassing all Hilbert-spaces, all Banach-spaces, all Von Neumann-algebras, all
C∗-algebras, and what have you. To the right of the concept of a vector-space one finds that
of a topological space, which is even more general (all vector-spaces have a norm-topology
and therefore are also topological spaces, but there are many more topological spaces which
are not vector-spaces). We are now at end ω.
We emphasise that when moving from α to ω along the abstraction-scale, the mathe-
matical structures do not become imprecise or inexact or vague or deserve any other pejorative
adjective. The key-word here is generality. To repeat, in mathematics generality means: hav-
ing many instantiations, having many applications in various branches of mathematics. In
meta-mathematics generality means: encompassing many non-isomorphic models. Gener-
ality is not vagueness. Generality is not a vice. Generality is not a basis for skepticism.
Enter the set-concept. What we want to argue next is that the set-concept, when we
conceive every set X also as a ‘structure’ 〈X,∈〉, is located somewhere in the middle of α
and ω (the fact that all structures can be seen as sets notwithstanding). This will motivate a
rejection of Connexion M (11).
(a) The ambition of set-theory to mount the founding throne of mathematics began to
emerge around the beginning of the XXth-century. In Section 1 we defined a Founding Theory
of Mathematics (F) to be a mathematical theory such that (F1) all concepts of mathematics can
be translated in the (formalised) language of F, and (F2) all thus translated theorems of
mathematics, accepted by the mathematical community as proved, are theorems of F. To
achieve (F1), F must have a quite flexible language, which accommodates translations of all
known mathematical concepts; in other words, it must be very ‘general’, rather than very
narrowly suited for a very specific mathematical subject-matter. To achieve (F2), the axioms
8It would then be more appropriate to write 〈N, ℘N, S, 0〉. This is not the same as saying that number theory,
e.g. Peano Arithmetic, is categorical, for that depends on whether a 1st- or a 2nd-order language is used.
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of F must possess an Atlas-like strength, because they must carry the whole wide world of
mathematical knowledge and all its abstract inhabitants. Now, if the axioms of F can serve
as a meaning-manual of the primitive concepts of F, and if they can even be considered as
an implicit definition of these concepts (so that AxF is also meaning-adequate and hence
founds mathematics adequately), and if AxF is deductively strong (so as to meet F2), then
the meanings AxF bestows on its primitive concepts will also be strong and ‘specific’. The
more axioms, or the ‘stronger’ the axioms, the more strictly the use of their concepts is
regimented, the more ‘specific’ their meanings are. Hence requirement (F1) together with the
requirement of meaning-adequacy, and requirement (F2) seem to pull in opposite directions
of the abstraction-scale: (F1) pulls towards end ω and (F2) pulls towards end α. So the
primitive concepts of any F will be found somewhere in the middle of end-points α and
ω. The Set-Foundation Thesis (10), then, suggests that the ‘structure’ 〈X,∈〉, the ‘primitive
structure’ of ZFC, actually resides somewhere in that middle.
(b) Further, it is a fact that we all have untouchable truths about the set-concept: we can
make subsets of sets; the cardinality of a finite set is some natural number; the cardinality of
the union-set of two disjoint sets is not smaller than the sum of the cardinalities of the disjoint
sets; self-membered sets are nonsense; if we replace every member of a given set with some
other thing, then we obtain another set with these other things as members; equinumerous
sets have the same cardinality; R has a larger cardinality than N; and so forth. Therefore it
does not make sense to say that sentence ϕ is a truth about sets iff it is a theorem. Of course,
ZFC performs so well in turning untouchable truths into theorems that we are prepared to
accept theoremhood as necessary for truths about sets generally — theoremhood for un-
touchable truths is a necessary condition for accepting a set-theory. But not as sufficient?
Remember also that ‘untouchable truth’ is not the same as model-theoretic truth (true in all
models), although there is a connexion which follows from untouchable truths being theo-
rems: they are therefore also model-theoretic truths. Well, there are many statements about
sets, formulated in L∈, where the intuition falls silent, even that of the experts in the field.
Those statements we gladly promote to the status of truth or falsehood as soon as they are
proved or disproved, respectively, in ZFC. But the point is that there are many statements
about sets which are demonstrably unprovable in ZFC. This all serves to illustrate that the
‘structure’ 〈X,∈〉 is somewhere in between ends α and ω on the abstraction-scale.
(c) Anyone who is an intellectual tourist in the current practice of set-theory (like this au-
thor), rather than an active researcher in the fields of Descriptive Set-Theory (Moschovakis
[1980]), of Constructible Sets (Devlin [1984]), of Classification Theory (Shelah [1985]), of
Model-Theory (Hodges [1993]) or of the Higher Infinite (Kanamori [2003]), will have con-
cluded that the set-concept currently encompasses much more than its originator Cantor ever
dreamt of. For instance, almost every sophisticated set-theoretical assertion can be shown to
be consistent with ZFC plus (the existence of) some large cardinal (kinds that Cantor never
dreamt of either), and vice versa. Now that we mention large cardinals: adding 84 inaccessi-
bles to ZFC makes the theory inconsistent if it is consistent with 17 ones, but adding instead
49 can be done consistently, although the resulting theory has no well-founded models. In
some model of ZFC, e.g. Go¨del’s constructible model 〈L,∈〉, there are ℵ1 real numbers (as
the continuum hypothesis requires), whereas in one of Cohen’s forced models there are ℵ137
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real numbers, which is 136 distinct levels of infinite cardinality higher up. A Report filled
with results like these can be drawn up by any intellectual tourist from the massive available
literature (see above). The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem is but one item in this Report. What
is this Report telling us?
Answer: this is what the set-concept is like. The meaning of the set-concept is such that as-
serting every single result in the Report is appropriate. This is what we have found out about
the set-concept. The answer is empathically not that we should turn skeptical about (the
meaning of) the set-concept, we submit, it is emphatically not that ZFC is inadequate to cap-
ture its ‘precise meaning’. No matter how set-theoreticians use the set-concept, they never
turn against ZFC.9 This is why M[set, ∈] (14) is exactly the right choice for the meaning-
manual of the set-concept. The meaning which M[set, ∈] bestows on the set-concept is such
that the Report is appropriate.
Although we suspect that in spirit S. Shelah [2002b: § 2] is quite close to what we are
defending here when he speaks about “the glory of proven ignorance: to show that we
cannot know”, we would prefer to speak of: the glory of proved knowledge of the meaning of the
set-concept. For to understand a concept is to have knowledge of its meaning and it stands
beyond reasonable doubt that the understanding of the set-concept has grown spectacularly
over the last century. A. Kanamori [2003: xx-xxi] submits that the Report of results tells us
the following (our italics):
From Skolem relativism to Cohen relativism the role of set-theory for mathematics be-
came even more evidently one of an open-ended framework rather than an elucidating
foundation. From this point of view, the fact that the axioms of ZFC do not determine
the cardinality of the set of reals seems an entirely satisfactory state of affairs. With the
richness of possibility for arbitrary reals and mappings, no axioms that do not directly im-
pose structure from above should constrain a set as open-ended as the collection of reals
or its various possibilities of well-ordering.10
We interpret this as saying that we have learned a lot about of the set-concept, namely that
it is such that it gives rise to a wealth of possibilities rather than selecting a single possibility
as ‘the right’ one. This is what the set-concept is like. In a recent overview of developments
in set-theory, J.R. Steel [2000: 428] writes about ZFC: “By placing classical set-theory in this
broader context, we have understood it better.” This is almost an identical wording to how we
prefer to put things: we have gained much knowledge about the meaning of the set-concept.
This is what the set-concept is like.
We conclude from (a), (b) and (c) that the set-concept is not located at or nearby end α of
the abstraction-scale; therefore imposing Connexion M (11) on set-theory is unreasonable.
The set-concept occupies a position on the abstraction-scale which falls outside the juris-
diction of Connexion M, if it has one at all. Imposing Connexion M is like surreptitiously
9Save a few exceptions, such as P. Aczel’s investigations into non-well-founded sets. Such entities arguably
fall under a concept that is markedly different from the set-concept we are discussing.
10The ‘open-endedness’ is often connected to M.A.E. Dummett’s notion of an ‘indefinitely extensible’ con-
cept, the handling of which must proceed with non-classical logic and some idem dito semantics, or so Dummett
argued. Paseau [2003] has confuted this thesis and has argued that classical logic and semantics will do just
fine for set-theory.
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shoving 〈X,∈〉 to end α, where it does not belong. But then the Skolemite skeptic’s argu-
ment (12) has an implausible premise and we therefore are no longer committed to whatever
conclusions follow from it, notably Set-Skepticism (9) and Foundational Skepticism (8).
5 The Working Set-Theoretician
The aim of the current Section (Aim C) is to explain the fact that few if any working set-
theorists feel a tension between, on the one hand, whatever the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theo-
rems and related results seem to be telling us about the set-concept, and, on the other hand,
their uncompromising and successful use of the set-concept and their continuing enthusi-
asm about this concept. We claimed earlier this is a genuine philosophical problem about the
practice of set-theory.
From the previous Sections the solution ought to be obvious: set-theoreticians have re-
jected Connexion M (11) unconsciously. That they must reject it, follows from our succinct
construal of the skeptic’s argument, which now turns into a philosophical reductio ad absur-
dum argument (12). For, given the Skolemite meta-theorems, in particular McIntosh Corol-
lary (5), and given the assertion that ZFC does capture the meaning of the set-concept ad-
equately — which is the denial of Set-Skepticism (9) —, it follows that Connexion M (11)
is false. As soon as Connexion M is rejected, we can straightforwardly explain the absence
of the mentioned tension among the working set-theoreticians: without Connexion M, one
cannot argue validly from meta-mathematical discourse, where proof and disproof rule, to
philosophical discourse, where analysis, argument and interpretation rule; more specifically,
without Connexion M (the bridge between these two realms of discourse), to claim that
the Skolemite meta-theorems entail skeptical theses (9) and (8) is to commit a non sequitur.
Only those who are inclined to accept Connexion M feel the mentioned tension, because as
soon as Connexion M is made explicit, the tension is validated by turning it into the logical
incompatibility between the Skolemite meta-theorems and the anti-skeptical claim that the
meaning of set-theory can be captured adequately. So much for Aim C.
Let us return to the situation of stalemate: given the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Meta-Theorem
(2), the skeptic validly draws skeptical conclusions about set-theory because she antecedently
accepts Connexion M (11), whereas the anti-skeptic validly rejects Connexion M because it
leads to skeptical conclusions. Since renouncing Connexion M explains a brute fact about the
practice of set-theory, whereas adumbrating it makes an explanation impossible, stalemate
has been broken in favour of the anti-skeptic, we submit. Recall that Aim F was to argue
that the skeptical argument (12) is unconvincing because Connexion M (11) is not plausible;
we claim to have mounted an argument to this effect.
6 Ubiquitous Undecidability
Famously, Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (CH), asserting there are ℵ1 real numbers —
or equivalently, the cardinality of ℘N equals that of R —, can be consistently added to
ZFC (proved by K. Go¨del around 1940) as well as its denial (proved by P.J. Cohen in 1964);
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in other words, CH is demonstrably independent of ZFC. In the decades following these
results, numerous sentences in L∈ have been demonstrated to be undecidable: Whithead’s
conjecture of free groups, Suslin’s hypothesis, Kurepka’s conjecture, ‘there is an inaccessible
cardinal’, etc (see Kunen [1980] and Hodges [1993], passim). Of course, to understand why
these meta-theorems hold, one must study their proofs. But is it possible to understand this
state of affairs without studying the proofs of all these undecidability-theorems and by only
pondering the meaning of the set-concept? We believe the answer is in the affirmative! We
think this will, then, also explain the relaxed attitude that most if not all set-theoreticians
have developed towards it.
The meaning of the set-concept is constituted by its meaning-manual M[set, ∈] (14),
which in the context of pure mathematics reduces to AxZFC[set, ∈]. What do the axioms
of ZFC say? Extensionality tells us that sets are fully fixed by their members and by noth-
ing else: if two sets share their members, then this is sufficient to pronounce them identical
(the converse is a theorem of logic, given the definition of = in L∈). Regularity prevents the
membership-relation from behaving pathologically; further, it simplifies proofs and makes
the cumulative hierarchy of sets exhaust the domain of discourse of ZFC. These are the only
axioms that tell us something about sets and ∈ ‘itself’, about ‘structure’ 〈X,∈〉 if you like,
and they do not tell us very much it seems. All the other axioms (Union, Power, Replace-
ment, Choice, Pair and Separation) are of the following type: if set X exists, then another set
related to X exists too. These axioms permit one to make many more sets if a set is given;
they tell us next to nothing about sets ‘themselves’. So we also must have an axiom positing
a set unconditionally; this is Infinity, which posits a smallest infinite set. That is all. End of
story. No ‘structural’ features are bestowed upon sets. Nothing is assumed about their cardi-
nalities or how these relate to each other; and mutatis mutandis for ordinal numbers; nothing
is assumed about whether their members can always be ordered in a particular fashion (sur-
prisingly, in 1904, Zermelo proved, using Choice, that sets can always be well-ordered).
When we look at these axioms, is it, then, such a miracle that a legion of complex sen-
tences in L∈ cannot be decided on the basis of these axioms? No, it is not. We call A. Kanamori
to the witness stand (see his testimony in the displayed quotation in the previous Section).
What we find miraculous is the Set-Foundation Thesis (10), the fact that 99% of all of cur-
rent mathematics can be seen as a body of theorems of ZFC, and that every single concept
and structure in mathematics can be defined in the extremely simple 1st-order language L∈.
What we find miraculous is that already such a gigantic amount of deep and interesting the-
orems about sets have been proved in ZFC. What we find miraculous is that so much about
ordinal- and cardinal-numbers can be proved whereas not a single axiom of ZFC even men-
tions these numbers, as if the theory is not about these numbers at all. And mutatis mutandis
for R (descriptive set-theory). So yes, given the meaning of the set-concept as constituted by
AxZFC, we can understand the ubiquitous undecidability phenomenon in set-theory very
well and ipso facto the relaxed attitude of the set-theoreticians towards it. Thus we have
reached our fourth aim (Aim D).
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7 Captivating Pictures
In this final Section, we are going to argue that the Skolemite skeptic is to a certain extent
‘in the grip of a picture’, to use Wittgensteinian slang (Aim E). We claim this explains the
skeptic’s tacit adherence to Connexion M. Two such pictures come to mind in the present
context: what we call since Wittgenstein [1953: 1-2] the ‘Augustinian picture of meaning’
(AugPict), and a ‘Platonist picture of reference and truth’ (PlatoPict). We hope to show that
these pictures are misleading, if not false, when taking them as illustrations of what is going
on in model-theory, which is where the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem meta-theorems belong — in this
capacity these pictures seduce us to accept Connexion M.
(AugPict) In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein [1953: § 1, our emphasis] writes,
after the long opening quotation from Augustine’s Confessiones:
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human lan-
guage. It is this: the individual words in language name objects — sentences are com-
binations of names. In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea:
every word has a meaning. It is the object for which the word stands.
This is usually called the Augustinian picture of meaning. Talk about model-theory as the
provider of the semantics of a formal language, as traditional terminology in logic would
have it, suggests that models bestow meaning on an otherwise ‘un-interpreted calculus of
symbols’; it suggests that the meaning of a word is “the object for which the word stands”.
The logical-positivists and the great Bourbaki [1968: 8], for example, implicitly or explicitly
subscribed to this Augustinian picture:
This faculty of being able to give different meanings to the words or prime concepts of
a theory is indeed an important source of enrichment of the mathematician’s intuition,
which is not necessarily spatial or sensory, as is sometimes believed, but is far more like
a certain feeling for the behaviour of mathematical objects, aided often by images from
very varied sources, but founded above all on everyday experience.
(From the model-theoretic context of this passage, it is evident that by “different meanings”
Bourbaki means: different referents.) Zermelo, Skolem, Von Neumann and other skeptics
were all to a considerable extent under the sway of the Augustinian picture, as were some
Formalists. Skolem [1941: 455] speaks of predicates having the same referents in two models
as “on conserve la signification” (conserving meaning). But also an anti-Formalist as the
Platonist Go¨del says (reported in Wang [1996: 180], our italics):
Language is nothing but a one-to-one correspondence between abstract objects and con-
crete objects (namely the linguistic symbols).
To assert generally that model-theory tells us what the set-terms of L∈ can mean amounts to
embracing (some version of the) Augustinian picture of meaning applied to the set-concept.
We then have new and mutually exclusive meanings of ‘set’ in every model!
Let us, for a moment, ponder what it generally means to interpret a linguistic expression.
If we understand an expression, that is, if we know its meaning (in the context in which it
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occurs), then there is no need to interpret it. We feel the need to interpret an expression iff
we do not understand it, iff we do not know what it means. Let us call such an expression
obscure for us. There are three, mutually exclusive cases of obscurity. One is that we can
think of more than one meaning of it but the context does not seem to single out one of them
— perhaps we are mistaken and have to read the text more carefully, or have to inquire
elsewhere to decide which meaning is the intended one. The second case is that we can
think of one meaning only but we are far from sure that this is what is meant. The third case
is that we cannot think of even a single meaning to attach to the expression. In this third
case, and arguably also the second case, it is natural to use the word ‘obscure’; but we use
it for the first case too for the sake of contrast & emphasis with what is to come. We now
take to interpret a linguistic expression to mean: to assign a meaning to it of which we are
confident it is the right one. Let us call interpretation in this sense Clarification.
Obviously, Clarification has nothing to with what model-theoreticians and logicians call
‘interpretation’. The task of model-theory is not to remove obscurity by assigning a clear
meaning to meaningless terms — unless, again, the Augustinian picture of meaning is
presupposed, for then to assign a referent will be to assign a meaning and then the meta-
mathematical domain of discourse will consist of meanings.
This consideration again leads us, again, to conclude that model-theoretic talk of the
semantics of an object-language, as if the activity of model-theoreticians has something to
do with assigning clear meanings to otherwise obscure expressions, i.e. with Clarification, is
highly misleading.
But if Clarification is not what model-theory is good for, then why do we engage in
it at all? Well, for reasons that any student of model-theory can tell you: we engage in
model-theory to prove the consistency-theorems about mathematical theories, to examine
the independence of axioms, to investigate various other meta-mathematical aspects, such
as soundness, completeness, the complexity of formal sentences and what have you. That
is the raison d’eˆtre of model-theory. We surely do not engage in model-theory in order to
liberate mathematics from a sorry state of meaninglessness and obscurity to restore Clarity.
Arguably mathematics is the clearest project of inquiry in the entire history of thought.
The Augustinian picture of meaning, which is strongly suggested by the terminology in
model-theory, is not just misleading in that it gives the wrong picture of what model-theory
is about, but also because it is an untenable picture of meaning generally and of meaning
in the language of mathematics in particular. The only facts available to investigate the
meaning of mathematical concepts is not to study the model-theory of the theories of the
concepts and ignore what mathematicians are doing, but to study the multifarious ways
in which these concepts are used by mathematicians at the object-level. In the grip of the
Augustinian picture, Connexion M, which asserts, roughly, that adequate meaning-capture
implies referential determinacy, is then almost a tautology, and who does not accept tautolo-
gies?
(PlatoPict) Another picture suggested by the model-theoretic terminology of ‘reference’
and ‘truth’ is the Platonic picture of reference and truth. In this picture, Mod(ZFC) is seen as
the whole of ‘all possible set-worlds’, which somehow (can be thought of to) exist indepen-
dently of us; these set-worlds are populated by items to which our object-language L∈ of
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ZFC can genuinely refer; this referring ‘explains’ why certain sentences in L∈ are true and
others are false of the given set-world. The referential indeterminacy of ZFC is, then, seen as
a weakness of ZFC: we talk ZFC but we do not and cannot have a clue which set-world we
are talking about, because all set-worlds in Mod(ZFC) make ZFC true. So a pluralist kind of
Platonism, a variety of maximally inflationary metaphysics, is hovering above such consid-
erations. (Besides this ‘many-worlds-interpretation’ of mathematics, the Platonist can single
out one set-world, preferably V to deflate her inflationary metaphysics a bit.)
The inadequacy of this picture as a picture of what is going on in model-theory becomes
clear when we focus on the several concepts involved in the comparison. One suggestive
model-theoretic misnomer is the word ‘referent’, e.g. by calling the images of the mapping
that sends ‘elements of the meta-domain of discourse’, the putative ‘referents’, to set-terms
of L∈. Whether inscrutable or not, it is a fact of linguistic practice that the reference-concept
is employed in acts of ostension, almost always are directly observable, spatially extended
chunks of matter, such as when we point to a cat on a mat when we say to a small child
‘There is a cat on the mat’, or point to a cherry in a tree when we say ‘There is a cherry in the
three’. (Possible confusion between the referents of the referring words in these sentences
disappears as soon as we point our finger and if needed accompanied with a few more
words.) Ostensive ceremonies that endow singular terms and descriptions with referents
and referential instances, respectively, observable or not, always involve causal dealings with
the observable world. Therefore the reference-concept, no matter how broadly construed,
has little, if anything, to do with the ‘reference-mapping’ of model-theory. The meaning
of the model-theoretic concept of reference is something completely different from what
we usually consider to be doing when we are refering, the fact there are also similarities
notwithstanding.
Exactly the same holds for the model-theoretic notions of existence and truth. The model-
theoretic notion of existence of objects to which terms of a formal language ‘refer’ is sim-
ply construed as we construe existence at the object-level (Obj): either as the provability of
existence-theorems (but now of the meta-theory rather than of the object-theory), or as the
consistent conjoinability of existence-sentences to the meta-theory (Hilbert’s notion of math-
ematical existence as consistency). In contradistinction to these two notions of mathematical
existence, the existence of cats, cherries, and even of unobservables such as the cosmic back-
ground radiation, tau-neutrinos and black holes is something completely different.
The model-theoretic notion of truth-in-a-language-by-a-model is for most theories a recur-
sively defined notion in terms of some ‘reference-mapping’ (‘satisfaction’), so that truth-
conditions also come under the rigourous sway of the meta-theory. The correspondence-
notion of truth is something quite distinct — some similarities intended by Platonists notwith-
standing. The truth of the matter of model-theory is that the models and everything they
are equipped with are just as much theoretical constructions at the meta-level as are the construc-
tions at the object-level. Putnam [1980: 482] considered this observation to be sufficient for the
solution of the Skolem trouble:11
Models are not lost noumenal waifs looking for someone to name them; they are con-
11Cf. Hallett [1994], who elaborates this point too.
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structions within our theory itself and they have names from birth.
The moment we realise this, the Platonic picture of reference and truth begins to dissolve
and Connexion M dissolves with it. We now have reached our fifth and sixth aim (Aims E
and F).
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